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Abstract
Based on Diewert’s idea that models under competition can be generalized to imperfect
competition using marginal prices, we develop a test for imperfect competition in the beef
packing industry.  Our model is more general and flexible than those depending on empirical
estimates of the input supply and output demand elasticities.
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A MODEL OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION IN THE BEEF PACKING INDUSTRY
WITH MARGINAL INPUT AND OUTPUT PRICES
Introduction
Market concentration in the beef packing industry has increased rapidly over the past few
decades as firms in the industry have consolidated.
1  The Herfindahl-Hirschman index, which
measures the sum of the squared market shares of firms in the industry, for steer and heifer
slaughter surpassed the 1800 mark in the early 1990s.  Thus, the industry is considered to be
highly concentrated based on the US Department of Justice’s and Federal Trade Commission’s
Horizontal Merger Guidelines.  Because of the high level of market concentration, there is
concern that beef packing firms are exercising market power in the purchase of finished cattle by
keeping cattle prices below competitive levels, and in the sale of packed beef by keeping prices
above competitive levels.
However, as indicated in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, an increase in market
concentration in itself is not enough to raise concerns about adverse competitive effects.  If a
market is contestable, that is, one in which there is free entry and exit, firms in the industry must
set price equal to marginal cost (Baumol).  Not doing so would invite entry.  The beef packing
industry can most accurately be described as contestable because there are few barriers to entry.
On the output side, imported beef competes with US beef so that high prices for packed beef
would induce entry in the form of importation.  On the input side, some may argue that spatial
characteristics of the market create a barrier to entry.  If the minimum efficient plant scale is
large, and Ward suggests that it is for beef packing, then efficient size plants must have access to
a large number of cattle to operate at capacity.  Yet Hayenga, Koontz, and Schroeder found that
the market for cattle is national in scope, with some cattle being shipped over 1,000 miles to
slaughter.  This suggests that packing plants may have access to sufficient numbers of cattle to
operate efficiently regardless of location.
                                                          
1 A history of consolidations and plant construction since 1961 for the three largest packers, IBP,
ConAgra, and Excel, can be found in Azzam and Anderson.2
Most previous studies of the beef packing industry have found evidence that firms, at
least part of the time, are exercising market power in the purchase of finished cattle (Schroeter,
Azzam and Pagoulatos, Schroeter and Azzam 1990, Azzam, Azzam and Park, and Koontz,
Garcia, and Hudson) or are exercising market power in the sale of packed beef (Schroeter and
Schroeter and Azzam 1990).  However, all of these studies are fairly restrictive in their
assumptions.  First, they assume a fixed proportional relationship between finished cattle input
and packed beef output, yet Wohlgenant found evidence of substantial substitution possibilities
between farm inputs and marketing inputs for beef and veal.  Also, Goodwin and Brester
concluded that technological changes in the food industry as a whole have allowed for greater
input substitutability.  Second, the studies that attempt to measure simultaneously the degree of
market power in both the input market and the output market assume that it is equal in both
markets (Schroeter and Schroeter and Azzam 1990).  Finally, the results of some of these studies
may depend on the specification for the input supply equation for finished cattle and the output
demand equation for packed beef (Azzam and Pagoulatos, Azzam and Park, Schroeter, Schroeter
and Azzam 1990, and Stiegert, Azzam, and Brorsen).
2  Previous studies by Muth and by Muth
and Wohlgenant, which allow for variable proportions, did not find evidence of market power in
the output and input markets for the beef packing industry, but the results of each of these studies
depend on the specification of input supply and output demand.
The goal of this paper is to develop a more general model of the beef packing industry to
test for market power in either the input market or the output market with relatively few
restrictions placed on the model.  It is based on the idea that the profit function under competition
can be generalized to the monopoly situation by replacing observed output market prices with the
shadow or marginal prices of output (Diewert 1974, 1978).  Likewise, by replacing the observed
input market prices with the shadow or marginal price of the inputs, the profit function can be
generalized to the monopsony situation.  To go one step further and make the model even more
                                                          
2 Modeling the input supply equation for cattle can be particularly difficult.  Empirical estimates
frequently yield negative own-price slopes because, if cattle prices are rising, producers will
retain heifers to add to the breeding stock rather than marketing them for slaughter in the current
period (see Rosen).3
general, the marginal prices can be modeled in such a way that they represent varying degrees of
market power between the two extremes of competition and monopoly or monopsony.
This method avoids the need to estimate input supply elasticities or output demand
elasticities; therefore, the results are not sensitive to the specification of either.  However,
because these elasticities are components of the measures of market power, it is not possible to
identify explicitly the degree of market power in each market.  It is possible, though, to test for
market power.  If competition is rejected, the model results will provide information on the
degree of distortion implied by market power.  In the following section, the expressions for
marginal input and marginal output prices are developed.
Marginal Input and Output Prices in the Beef Packing Industry
The profit equation of the j
th beef packing firm in the industry, allowing for variable
proportions, can be represented by
( ) ( ) ' 1 pj j p f = × - × x w x
where p is output price, fj(x) is the production function given the vector of inputs, x, and w is a
vector of input prices.  The first-order condition with respect to the level of finished cattle input,
x1, allowing for imperfect competition in the packed beef market and in the finished cattle
market, is
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where Q is total industry output of packed beef, qj=fj(x), and X1 is total industry purchases of
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 is the input market supply elasticity for











 is the input conjectural elasticity of firm j.  The value of qj
ranges from zero (perfect competition) to one (monopoly).  The value of fj also ranges from zero4
(perfect competition) to one (monopsony).  Intermediate values of qj and fj between zero and one
represent intermediate degrees of market power in the output market or in the input market
respectively.
To obtain an industry-wide expression for equation (3), further assumptions are necessary
for aggregation.  In most studies of market power, one of two aggregation approaches is taken.
3
The first approach is to assume that firms are identical in their technologies and thus they have
the same conjectural elasticities in equilibrium (Appelbaum, Azzam and Pagoulatos, Holloway,
Lopez, Murray, Schroeter, Wann and Sexton).  The second approach is to aggregate a firm-level
expression by averaging it over firms or by summing its share-weighted firm-specific
components (Azzam and Schroeter 1991 and 1995, Koontz, Garcia, and Hudson, and Schroeter
and Azzam 1990 and 1991).  The approach taken in this study, which is outlined in the appendix,
falls into the latter category.



































and, likewise, the expression








An Empirical Model of the Beef Packing Industry
As suggested by Diewert (1974, 1978), marginal prices obtained under imperfect
competition can replace the observed market prices in an indirect profit function.  The marginal
prices derived above are inserted into a normalized quadratic profit function for a representative
firm (Diewert and Ostensoe).  The advantages of this functional form is that it is flexible and can
allow for nonconstant returns-to-scale technology.  By applying Hotelling’s lemma to the indirect
profit function, normalized on p1, we obtain the following general expression for output supply
and input demand:
                                                          
3 A third approach is to ignore the issue of aggregation (Azzam and Park) or to argue that firm-
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for z1, … , zM capital stock inputs and variable outputs and inputs with prices p1, …, pN.
Because of the normalization on p1, a1i = ai1 = 0 for i = 1, …, N; b1j = bj1 = 0 for j = 1, …, M;
and b1 = 0.  The last three terms in equation (5) allow for nonconstant returns-to-scale
technology.  If constant returns to scale correctly characterizes the industry, then b0 = 0; b2 = 0,
…, bM = 0; and c1 = 0, …, cN = 0.
Normalizing on the price of marketing inputs used in beef production, allowing for one
capital stock variable, z1, and inserting the marginal output and input price expressions, the
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where q is output of packed beef, p
* is the marginal output price of packed beef, x1 is the input of
finished cattle,w1
* is the marginal input price for finished cattle, w2 is the wage rate for
meatpacking labor, w3 is an energy cost index, and w4 is a price index of other marketing inputs.
Labor, energy, and other marketing inputs are assumed to be purchased in competitive markets.
4
From the symmetry restriction on the profit function, the effect of the input price on
output supply should be equal but opposite in sign to the effect of output price on input demand.
Expanding the expression for the marginal prices in equations (6) and (7), the symmetry
restriction implies that















                                                          
4 Input demand equations for labor and energy could have been derived as well but the quantity
data necessary to estimate these equations are not available.  Furthermore, the test for imperfect
competition does not depend on these equations.6
Thus, the estimated coefficients will be equal only if there is perfect competition in the input and
output markets, i.e., q = f = 0.
5  However, because h and e are not estimated explicitly in this
formulation, q and f cannot be identified.  If the restriction is rejected, though, the relative
magnitudes of a23 and a32 will provide evidence regarding the level of distortion in the market
caused by imperfect competition.
Data Sources
The data used to estimate the preceding model are aggregate annual time-series data for
the years 1966 through 1995.  Cattle input quantities, wholesale beef quantities, cattle prices, and
wholesale beef prices were obtained from the USDA’s Red Meats Yearbook and Livestock and
Meat Statistics.  The farm price for cattle is the series “slaughter steer prices, choice 2-4,
Nebraska, 1100-1300 pounds” in both of these publications.  These prices were adjusted for by-
product allowances, which were obtained from the USDA’s Animal Products Branch of the
Economic Research Service.  Wholesale beef prices were converted from prices per retail pound
to prices per wholesale pound by dividing by 1.5133.  The energy price index was obtained from
USDA’s Food Cost Review, and the average hourly meat packing wage was obtained from the
Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Employment, Hours, and Earnings.  The consumer price index (CPI),
which was used as a proxy for the price of other marketing inputs, was obtained on the Internet
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Data for the variables that were used as instruments for the endogenously determined
wholesale beef price and farm cattle price were obtained from the following sources.  Per capita
consumption expenditures and population data were obtained from the Economic Report of the
President.  The retail poultry CPI and the retail pork CPI were obtained from the USDA’s Food
Consumption, Prices, and Expenditures.  Inventories of beef cattle were obtained from the
USDA’s Red Meats Yearbook and Livestock and Meat Statistics.  Corn prices were obtained
from the USDA’s Feed Situation and Outlook.  All of the price and expenditure instrumental
variables were deflated by the CPI.
                                                          
5 Note that q/h cannot otherwise equal f/e because q and f are non-negative, h < 0, and e > 0.7
Results of Estimation and Specification Testing
Equations (6) and (7) were estimated jointly by nonlinear three-stage least squares (3SLS)
with first-order autoregressive error terms (quasi-first differencing).  The parameter a1 was set
equal to one because it is not identifiable in these equations from the other parameters a22, …,
a25 and a32, …, a35.  The CPI was used as a proxy for the price of other marketing inputs used in
producing packed beef based on the assumption that the price of these inputs moves in
proportion to the CPI.  Because data are not available on the quantity of capital stock used in the
beef packing industry, trend was used as a proxy.  Instrumental variables included the exogenous
variables (w2, w3, and t) as well as variables associated with wholesale demand for packed beef
(consumption expenditures, population, pork prices, and poultry prices) and variables associated
with the supply of finished cattle (corn prices and cattle inventories).
Both the restricted (a23=a32) and unrestricted specifications were estimated.  In both
equations for both specifications, the first-order autoregressive error parameters were in the range
of 0.36 to 0.37 and were significant.  Ljung-Box statistics calculated at 6 and 12 lags for both
specifications failed to reject the null hypothesis that the resulting residuals were white noise.
Thus, this specification of the error structure of the models appears to be correct.
6
Gallant and Jorgenson’s method of testing restrictions in nonlinear models was used to
test the symmetry restriction.  With this method, the restricted specification is reestimated using
the estimated variance-covariance matrix of the unrestricted model.  The test statistic is the
difference in the number of observations multiplied by the change in objective function values,
and the degrees of freedom are equal to the number of restrictions imposed.  When the test was
conducted for this model, the restriction was not rejected (p-value = 0.148), suggesting that the
beef packing industry can be characterized as perfectly competitive in its output market and input
market.
The results of estimation for the unrestricted and restricted specifications are presented in
Table 1.  In general, with the exception of the output supply slope, the estimates of the restricted
                                                          
6 Models used to estimate the degree of market power are frequently quasi-first differenced
(Azzam and Pagoulatos; Azzam and Park; Koontz, Garcia, and Hudson; Schroeter; and Schroeter
and Azzam 1990), but the values of the autoregressive parameters are not always reported.8
specification are as expected based on theory, but the estimates of the unrestricted model are not.
For the restricted specification, the output supply elasticity, evaluated at the means of the sample
period, is -0.07 but not significantly different from zero.  This suggests nearly perfectly inelastic
output supply.  The input demand elasticity, evaluated at the means of the sample period, is
-0.44, suggesting inelastic demand for live cattle.  In addition, the elasticity of output supply with
respect to the input price is negative as expected (-0.33 at the sample means), and the elasticity of
input demand with respect to output price is positive as expected (0.36 at the sample means).
Of particular interest are the estimates of the coefficients intended to capture the effects
of nonconstant returns to scale (g20, g21, g22, g30, g31, g32).  In both specifications, the intercept
coefficient estimates (g20 and g30) and the 1/z1 coefficient estimates (g22 and g32) are significant,
suggesting that beef packing technology is most appropriately characterized as nonconstant
returns to scale.  In addition, the Gallant and Jorgenson test was applied to test the restriction that
these coefficients are jointly equal to zero.  The constant returns-to-scale restriction was strongly
rejected (p-values < 0.01) for both the specification in which the symmetry restriction was
imposed and the one in which it was not.  However, because this is an aggregate model, these
results must be evaluated in that context.  Although constant returns to scale for the industry as a
whole is rejected, it could be rejected in part due to the effects of the size distribution of firms.
Individual firms may experience constant returns to scale but when firms are aggregated, some
with high-average costs and others with low-average costs, nonconstant returns to scale may
appear at the industry level.  However, it is important to include these effects in a test for market
power.
Conclusions and Extensions
A model of the beef packing industry was developed to test for imperfect competition in
either or both the input market for finished cattle and the output market for packed beef.
Expressions for marginal input prices and marginal output prices that allow for varying degrees
of market power were derived and inserted into a normalized quadratic indirect profit function
for a representative beef packing firm that allows for nonconstant returns to scale.  An output
supply equation and an input demand equation were then derived by Hotelling’s lemma.  Because9
of the symmetric relationship between the effect of input price on output supply and the effect of
output price on input demand, a cross-equation restriction was obtained that will hold only under
perfect competition in both markets.
This model is more general than previous studies of market power in beef packing for
four reasons.  First, the model does not assume fixed proportions in beef packing, and it allows
the degree of market power in the input and the output market to differ.  Furthermore, the results
of model estimation do not depend on empirical estimates of the input supply elasticity or the
output demand elasticity.  However, because these elasticities, which are components of the
measures of the degree of market power, were not estimated, it is possible to test for market
power but not identify the degree of market power.  Finally, the model allows for nonconstant
returns-to-scale technology.
The model was estimated in quasi-first differences in both restricted (symmetry imposed)
and unrestricted form.  Using Gallant and Jorgenson’s method of testing restrictions in nonlinear
models, the null hypothesis that the cross-equation restriction holds was not rejected.  Thus both
the input market for finished cattle and the output market for packed beef appear to be perfectly
competitive.  Furthermore, it appears that returns to scale are nonconstant at the aggregate
industry level.
Further work needs to be done to determine the sensitivity of these results to other
possible data series.  In particular, different proxies for the price of marketing inputs used in beef
packing and the quantity of capital stock may improve the results of estimation.  Estimating the
model with these alternative data series would allow us to determine whether the results
regarding the test for perfect competition and for constant returns to scale are sensitive to these
changes.10
Table 1.  Results of Nonlinear 3SLS Estimation of Output Supply and Input Demand
Equations for Beef Packing, 1966-1995
Specification
Regressor Coefficient Unrestricted Restricted (a23=a32)









































Adjusted R2 — 0.8450 0.8414









































Adjusted R2 -- 0.7595 0.7411
Objective value * N -- 34.3934 30.5310
Note:  Endogenous variables are y, x1, p, and w1, and numbers in parentheses are standard errors.11
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APPENDIX
Because the output and input conjectural elasticities may take on different values, the
aggregation problem needs to be considered in each market individually.  In this appendix, the
aggregation condition is first obtained for the situation where only input market power exists.
Then, it is obtained for the situation where only output market power exists.  Finally, it is
obtained for the situation where market power exists in both markets but, for each firm, the
market shares in the input market and in the output market are equal.  In each case, however, the
resulting expressions for marginal output prices and marginal input prices are identical.
Aggregation with Market Power in the Input Market
If we assume that the output market is perfectly competitive, and thus, qj is zero, but that
























By multiplying through by the input market share, sj
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represent the sum of the share-weighted conjectural elasticities of firms in


















å  represent the sum of the share-weighted marginal
products of firms in the industry.  Then, the industrywide counterpart to equation (A.1) is
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* is the share-weighted “marginal price” for finished cattle (x1).  This expression is




redefine as M, rather than its individual components.  Note that if f=0, then w1
* equals the
perfectly competitive market price for cattle, w1.  If f=1, then w1
* represents the monopsony
price for cattle.  If f falls between zero and one, then w1
* represents the price that firms expect to
pay for finished cattle after taking into account the reaction of other beef packing firms in the
industry to its purchases of finished cattle.
Aggregation with Market Power in the Output Market
If instead we assume that the input market is perfectly competitive, and thus, fj is zero,























By multiplying through by the output share, sj
O, and summing over N firms in the industry,
equation (A.4) becomes
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represent the sum of the share-weighted output conjectural





























.  Note that if q=0,
then p
* equals the perfectly competitive market price for packed beef, p.  If q=1, then p
*
represents the monopoly price for packed beef.  If q falls between zero and one, then p
*
represents the price that firms expect to receive for packed beef after taking into account the
reaction of other firms in the industry to its sales in the market.
Aggregation with Input and Output Market Power and Equal Market Shares
An aggregate expression for the first-order condition with market power in both markets
can be derived if we assume that each firm has equal market shares in both the purchase of the
finished cattle and in the sale of packed beef.  Now, its market share can be represented by
s s s j j
O
j
I = = .  The summed share-weighted industry expression for equation (3) is then
( . )
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Again, assume that firms in the industry have equal value of marginal products in equilibrium,












represent the sum of the share-weighted conjectural


























which can be rewritten asp
f
x






  Hence, by assuming equal market shares in both
markets, an expression with marginal prices in both the output and the input markets can be
derived.